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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS







EAST ORANGE COMMUNITY CHARTER SCHOOL; THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES
OF THE EAST ORANGE COMMUNITY CHARTER SCHOOL
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 07-cv-03227)
District Judge:  Honorable Dennis M. Cavanaugh
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 7, 2010
Before: RENDELL, HARDIMAN and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges





Wanda Williams, proceeding pro se, appeals from an order of the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey granting summary judgment in favor of the
      Williams also alleged religious discrimination under Title VII and age discrimination1
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.  Because she did not include these
claims in her complaint, the District Court did not consider them.  
       A District Court has discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over2
state law claims if the court “has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction.”  28 U.S.C. 1367(c)(3).  As explained below, the District Court properly
rejected Williams’ claims under federal law.  Therefore, it plainly acted within its
discretion in declining to hear her state law claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress.  See Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 480 n.6 (3d Cir. 2000). 
2
Appellees in her employment discrimination lawsuit.  We will affirm.
On September 1, 2004, the East Orange Community Charter School informed
Williams that her contract for employment as a “Long-Term Substitute Teacher” would
not be renewed.  She filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”) on August 3, 2005, complaining of  race discrimination in violation of Title
VII.   The EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter, which Williams received on March 19,1
2007.  On July 12, 2007, she filed a complaint against the Charter School and its Board of
Trustees in the District Court, alleging race discrimination and retaliation under Title VII,
violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and intentional infliction of
emotional distress.  The District Court granted the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, holding that Williams’ Title VII claims were time barred, concluding that she
failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with respect to her ADA claims, and
declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim.   Williams appealed.2
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over an
3
order granting a motion for summary judgment.  See Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161
F.3d 217, 221 (3d Cir. 1998).  A grant of summary judgment will be affirmed if our
review reveals that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  We review the
facts in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was
entered.  See Coolspring Stone Supply, Inc. v. American States Life Ins. Co., 10 F.3d
144, 146 (3d Cir. 1993).
A plaintiff bringing an employment discrimination claim under Title VII must
comply with the procedural requirements set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5.  Pursuant to
that provision, a Title VII complainant has 90 days from the receipt of an EEOC
right-to-sue letter to bring an action in court.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); Seitzinger v.
Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 165 F.3d 236, 239 (3d Cir. 1999).  Williams alleged that she
received the right-to-sue letter on March 19, 2007.  Therefore, Williams had until
Monday, June 18, 2007, to file her complaint.   She did not file her complaint, however,
until July 12, 2007.  Williams has cited no basis for equitably tolling the limitations
period.  Accordingly, we agree with the District Court that the Title VII claims are
time-barred.
Williams also alleged in her complaint that the defendants failed to provide her
with reasonable accommodations as required by the ADA after she was injured when a
child hugged her around the neck.  Before filing a complaint, a plaintiff alleging
discrimination under the ADA must exhaust her administrative remedies by filing a
charge with the EEOC.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (adopting
Title VII enforcement scheme and remedies for ADA).  The ensuing suit is limited to
claims that are within the scope of the initial administrative charge.  See Antol v. Perry,
82 F.3d 1291, 1296 (3d Cir. 1996).  “The purpose of requiring exhaustion is to afford the
EEOC the opportunity to settle disputes through conference, conciliation, and persuasion,
avoiding unnecessary action in court.”  Id.  Williams did not bring an ADA claim to the
attention of the EEOC, and such a claim did not fall within the scope of her charge to the
EEOC alleging that the defendants discriminated against her on the basis of race, religion,
and age.  See id. at 1295-96; Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 541 F.2d 394, 398-99
(3d Cir. 1976) (holding that “the parameters of the civil action in the district court are
defined by the scope of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to
grow out of the charge of discrimination.” (citations omitted)).  Thus, the District Court
properly concluded that Williams failed to exhaust her administrative remedies for her
ADA claim.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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